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After Austin flushed its storm sewers in 1961, seventy tons of dead
fish were strewn along the banks of the river below. 1 In the eight years
since, our rivers have become no healthier; so polluted with oil and
chemicals that it cannot support even the lowliest sludge worm, the
Cuyahoga River burst into flames last summer and nearly destroyed
two railroad bridges.2
Blunted by bureaucratic timidity and deference to industry, the
Federal Water Quality Act3 and various state anti-pollution statutes4
have proved ineffective. This Note will suggest, however, that a secon-
dary effect of the recent Federal Act may be to revivify private nuisance
actions," and thus to help restore the quality of our water.
I. "Reasonable Use" as a Defendant's Rule
The basis of a nuisance action is that unreasonable use by the
defendant has caused unreasonable harm to the plaintiff.0 Under the
1. R. CARSON, SILENT SPRING 145 (1962).
2. TiarE, Aug. 1, 1969, at 41.
3. Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903, enacting 33 U.S.C,
§§ 466-1 and 466c-1 and amending 33 U.S.C. §§ 466,d,e,gh,i (1964) (codified at 33 US.C.
§§ 466-466k (Supp. IV 1969)). This Act established water quality standards; it was one of
a number of amendments to the basic Federal pollution legislation, the Fed. Water Pollu-
tion Control Act of 1948, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155.
4. The most complete catalogue of state actions to establish water quality standards
and/or stream classification appears in Hearings on S.649 Before the Subcomm. on Air
and Water Pollution of the Senate Pub. Works Comm., 88th Cong., 1st Sess. at 119-22
(1963). At the time of these hearings thirty-six states had enabling legislation; twenty-two
states had acted upon that legislation. Depending upon the peculiarities of the gtatutes
involved, the arguments advanced in this Note may be applicable to standards set pursuant
to state statutes. But in this respect, see the limiting provision in N.Y. Pun. IEAL'rll LAW
§ 1261 (McKinney Supp. 1969):
The basis for proceedings or actions resulting from the violations of the prohibitions
contained in this article inure solely to and are for the benefit of the people generally
of the State of New York, and it is not intended to in any way create new, or enlarge
existing rights of riparian owners or others. A determination by the water resources
commission or the commissioner that pollution exists or that violations of any of tile
prohibitions in this article, whether or not a proceeding or action may be brought by
the state, shall create by reason thereof no presumptions of law or findings of fact
inuring to or for the benefit of persons other than the state.
5. The legal literature has documented the failings of the private tort action. See, e.g.,
Hanks, The Law of Waters in New Jersey, 22 RuTGEs L. REv. 621, 668 (1968); Hines, Nor
Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality, 52 IowA L. REv. 186, 196-201
(1966); Note, Statutory Treatment of Industrial Stream Pollution, 24 GEo. WASlh L. Rtv.
302, 305-10 (1956).
6. 1 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAw OF ToRTs, § 1.24 at 71 (1956). Prosser takes the some-
what different position that nuisance "has reference to the interests invaded, to the danage
or harm inflicted, and not to any particular kind of act or omission whid has led to the
invasion." PROssER, TiE Aw or ToRs, § 88, at 594 (1964).
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riparian theory of water rights, which prevails in the eastern United
States,7 every owner of property adjacent to a watercourse has a right
to use the water which passes his property. According to the most widely
accepted form of this theory, a riparian has the right to make reason-
able use of the water subject to the similar right of all other riparians8
Thus, the "reasonable use" form of the riparian theory of water rights
fits conveniently into the format of the nuisance action: since both
plaintiff and defendant have a right to reasonable use of the water-
course, the courts must ask the interrelated questions whether the
defendant's pollution has exceeded reasonable use and whether the
defendant's polluting activities have infringed upon the plaintiff's right
to a reasonable use.9
In actual water rights cases, however, the courts have focused al-
most exclusively upon the social value of the defendant's conduct
7. Mhe riparian doctrine forms the primary basis of the laws governing the use of
natural watercourses in most eastern states-that is, the 31 states lying east of the tier
from the Dakotas to Texas.
1 WATER AND WTATER RIGHTS § 19.1, at 83 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
The prior appropriation theory forms the basis of Western water law. In briefest form
the prior appropriation theory holds that water may be taken from a wvatercoure for any
beneficial use and that priority in time creates priority in right. This theory primarily
addresses the problem of water diversion rather than that of pollution. In its "Colorado"
or strict form, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Neveda, New Mexico, Utah and
Wyoming adhere to this doctrine. Id. § 39.2. The line of analysis pursued in this Note
is not on point for those jurisdictions. But see Hines, supra note 5, at 196-97, suggesting
that since the action is usually brought under the law of private nuisance, the standard
does not vary with the theory of water rights employed by the particular state. The
mixed systems in California, Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Dakota, Texas and Washington contain elements of the riparian doctrine. Consequently
the analysis pursued here may have some application in several of thomc states. See 5 R.
PoiwaLr, TH ELAw OF REAL PROPERTY J 73942 (1968).
8. See Note, Stream Pollution-Recovery of Damages, 50 IowA L. RMv. 141, 142 (1964).
The other form of riparian theory, "natural flow," provides that a riparian is entitled to
the use of water undiminished in quantity or quality. Id. Courts frequently allude to
"natural flow" but employ "reasonable use" as the actual test of the permissible limit of
both diversion and pollution. Hanks, supra note 5, at 670-71. For a discussion of the extent
to which various states have adopted "reasonable use," see IL POWELL, supra note 7,
711-12.
9. The RXsTATEMIYuNT OF TORTS views the "reasonable use" test as a weighing of the
utility of the defendant's use against the gravity of the resulting harm. RrsTAT Mt%'T or
ToRTs § 852 (1939). Utility of the use should be measured by
(a) the social value which the law attaches to the primary purpose for which the use
is made;
(b) the suitability of the use to the watercourse or lake, and to the customs and
usages existing with respect to it;
(c) the impracticability of preventing or avoiding the harm; and
(d) the classification of the use as riparian or nonriparian.
Id. § 853.
Gravity of the harm is measured by strikingly similar considerations:
(a) the extent of the harm involved;(b) the social value which the law attaches to the particular type of use of uater
which is interfered with;
(c) the suitability of such use to the particular watercourse or lake;
(d) the burden on the proprietor harmed of avoiding the harm; and
(e) the classification of the use as riparian or nonriparian.
Id. § 854.
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and upon the suitability of the defendant's activity to the watercourse.
In the leading case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson,1" for ex-
ample, the defendant was admittedly discharging large quantities
of acid from its mining operations into a stream. Nevertheless, the
lower riparian who brought an action in nuisance was denied recov-
ery. The court held that the defendant was engaged in an activity
beneficial to the commonwealth and that it might carry on mining
activities as before. Although the court specifically left open the
possibility that pollution might constitute a nuisance, the abatement
of which might be required by the public interest in "the general
health and well-being of the community,"" the Sanderson opinion
emphasizes the importance of the development of natural resources
and the unfairness of holding the mining company accountable for
"consequences which it could not control."' 2 The phrase "conse-
quences which it could not control," of course, begs the question.
Under an improved version of the Sanderson doctrine, when a
nuisance action is brought against someone engaged in a socially
beneficial activity, the court must inquire into the standard practice
within the appropriate industry to determine whether the defendant
has acted reasonably.' 3 But by setting the standard according to what
is, rather than what ought to be, the "industry practice" test still
favors polluters unduly.
Yet a further improvement on the Sanderson doctrine would adjust
the "industry practice" standard to reflect differences in the quality of
individual watercourses. But the incremental process by which our
rivers are destroyed minimizes the effectiveness of such control. Only in
those rare instances in which pollution by one manufacturer creates
a marked decline in water quality or in which pollution of a river is
stopped at an early stage' 4 does the character of the watercourse
avail as a limitation upon defendant's reasonable use. Gross pollution
by other riparians becomes a justification for pollution by the ripar-
ian defendant, and "character of the watercourse" reduces to "indus-
10. 113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886).
11. Id. at 149, 6 A. at 459.
12. Id. at 147, 6 A. at 457.
13. See, e.g., Snow v. Parsons, 28 Vt. 459 (1856), where the court reversed and remanded
a judgment for the plaintiff with instructions that the lower court accept testimony offered
by the defendant tannery "on the usage in the country as to tanneries." Id. at 464,
14. Even at an early stage, the factor may be meaningless. In McDonough v. Russell-
Miller Miling Co., 38 NJ). 465, 165 N.W. 504 (1917) the court reasoned that It ought not
to arrest manufacturing by insisting upon pristine streams where there have been no
previous users.
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try practice" with a slight twist. For example, a court under the
influence of the Sanderson doctrine will find it impossible to recognize
that the sum of actions by a number of polluters, each of which seems
reasonable in its own right, may nonetheless create an invasion of a
plaintiff's right to reasonable use of the watercourse.
The "industry practice" standard evolved at a time when manu-
facturers could pollute some rivers without depriving the people
generally of the opportunity to use other rivers for recreation. But
rapid industrialization has by now spread pollution to nearly all of
our rivers. In consequence, the law must recognize that waste disposal
can no longer be the only legitimate use of a river. However modified
or refined,1 the Sanderson doctrine suffers from an essential weak-
ness: its one-sided emphasis on the social benefits of the defendant's
activity and on the suitability of that activity to the watercourse
mocks the balancing process which is the theoretical basis of nuisance
law. The courts should also measure the reasonableness of a defen-
dant's use in terms of damage to the plaintiff because the quality of
the water he receives is below that to which he is entitled as a riparian
owner.
Even when accepting in theory that a plaintiff is entitled to have
the character of the watercourse assessed from his own perspective,
courts have lacked a base line from which to judge the unreasonable-
ness of his alleged harm. Unaided by legislation, the judicial process
has demonstrably failed to determine the limit beyond which a
watercourse may not be polluted; thus, the practical effect of the
reasonable use test has been to slight the interests of the injured
riparian and of the general public.
The Federal Water Quality Act'0 may finally have made possible
effective recognition of the rights of the injured riparian. Under the
procedure established by the Act for the setting of water quality
standards on interstate watercourses, each state, subject to the ap-
proval of the Secretary of the Interior, adopts "water quality criteria
applicable to interstate waters or portions thereof within such State"
and "a plan for the implementation and enforcement of the water
15. While the Sanderson decision has been distinguished on the facts and while many
courts have taken a more enlightened approach (see, e.g., Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co., 164
N.Y. 303, 58 N.E. 142 (1900)), the negative impact of the Sanderson premises about
resource use is reflected in the infrequency of private nuisance actions in the face of a
general deterioration in water quality.
16. See note 3, supra. For the legislative history, see 1965 US. CODE CO.xo. & ADr.
Nmvs 331ff.
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quality criteria adopted .. ."17 The Secretary of the Interior has
reached basic agreement with all states except Iowa.18
While the Federal Act is significant for its statement of public policy
and for its comprehensive approach to the evaluation of pollution data,
it suffers from a weak enforcement mechanism., Under the Act,
the Secretary of the Interior "may request" that the Attorney Gen-
eral initiate a law suit against a polluter.2 0 When the damage from
pollution occurs in the same state as the discharges which cause it,
the Secretary must obtain the written consent of the Governor of
that state.21 In any event he must give polluters at least 180 days'
notice before initiating abatement action.2 2 There are no reported
cases under the Act. Political and personal factors can delay enforce.
ment while pollution continues at a dangerous rate. 3 Fortunately,
the water quality standards promulgated pursuant to the Act may
offer an alternative method of control by providing the hitherto
missing item necessary for successful private nuisance actions.
II. "Reasonable Use" as a Two-Edged Sword
Survival of the private nuisance action in the face of the Federal
Act 24 raises the possibility that the riparian will be subject to incon-
17. 33 U.S.C. § 466g(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1969). Water quality standards are of two types.
receiving water standards state the required condition of the stream, and effluent standards
specify the required characteristics of wastes to be discharged. 3 WxrrAa AND NVATER RIoUrs
(R. Clark ed. 1967) § 229.1, at 234-37. The Federal Act provides for quality criteria (recelv.
ing water standards) and enforcement plans (presumably effluent standards).
18. N.Y. Times, April 7, 1969, at 59, col. 2 (noting also that the Secretary of the
Interior has taken exception to particular aspects of the standards in various states).
19. For a complete exposition of the enforcement mechanism of the Act, see 3 WATnt
AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 17, § 248, at 381-404.
20. 33 U.S.C. § 466(g)(c)(5) (Supp. IV 1969) as it authorizes action under § 466g(g)(1.2)
(Supp. IV 1969).
21. 33 US.C. § 466g(g)(2) (Supp. IV 1969).
22. 33 U.S.C. § 466g(c)(5) (Supp. IV 1969) as it authorizes action under § 466g(g)(2)(Supp. IV 1969).
23. The following colloquy, relating to enforcement under an earlier version of the
Act, is illustrative.
Senator Muskie. Now, with respect to the decisionmaking, what factors must you
submit to justify an enforcement action?
Mr. Stein [Chief Enforcement Officer of the Federal Water Pollution Control Ad.
ministration]. Well, I think the factors are: one, the situation of pollttion, ati
secondly, what we would determine would be the reaction of the State water pollution
control officials....
Senator Muskie. So you really supply them with two sets of facts-one on the merits
of the case, and two, on the political climate?
Mr. Stein. Yes-in the broad sense-yes, sir.
Hearings on S. 649, supra note 4, at 81. Similar problems have strangled enforcement by
state agencies.
The non-enforcement problem is rooted in the essential unwillingness of the control
agency to bring the full force of the enforcement procedure to bear on the polluter,
Hines, supra note 5, at 227.




sistent rules of substantive law; judicial disregard of the standards
set under the Act would leave riparians uncertain of their respon-
sibilities. On the other hand, voluntary adoption of the standards
by courts would achieve a desirable uniformity of substantive law.
The guidelines for the determination of water quality standards
require the proper authority to engage in the same balancing process
that is appropriate to the private nuisance action:
Standards of quality. . shall be such as to protect the public
health or welfare, enhance the quality of water, and serve the
purposes [of this Act]. . . In establishing such standards the
Secretary, the Hearing Board, or the appropriate State Authority
shall take into consideration their use and value for public water
supplies, propagation of fish and wildlife, recreational purposes,
and agricultural, industrial, and other legitimate uses. -5
To foster its objectives, the Act requires basin-wide allocation
plans. Each riparian is permitted to dispose of an amount of waste
suited to the demands of his activity and to the capacity of the water-
course. Thus, built into the water quality standards is a weighing of
the social value of competing riparian uses and of the suitability of
these uses to the particular watercourse. While the Sanderson court
foresaw that the "general health and well-being of the community"
might require affirmative steps to abate pollution, it shirked the
difficult job of balancing necessary to determine what is "reasonable
use."2 6 The water quality standards embody precisely this balancing
by setting, as to each riparian, a maximum level beyond which all
pollution is impermissible.
Acceptance of the Federal water quality standards as relevant to a
determination of the reasonableness of a polluter's discharge would raise
the question of the procedural effect to be given to proof by the
plaintiff that the defendant has caused water quality to fall below the
minimum prescribed by the standards. By analogy with per se negli-
gence the standards might be given conclusive effect.27 Other riparians
(at least as members of the general public) are certainly among those
intended to be protected from the defendant's conduct, and the in-
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as impairing or in any manner affecting an)
fight or jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters (including boundar)
waters) of such states.
33 U.S.C. § 466(c) (Supp. IV 1969).
25. Id. § 466g(c)(3).
26. See p. 104 supra.
27. The RSATEmNr OF ToRTs offers criteria for the adoption of legislative or ad-
ministrative standards as per se standards of conduct in tort actions and suggests that the
criteria are applicable to nuisance as well as to negligence. REsrAmt.-r (SEco.aD) Or
ToRTs § 286 (1965).
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jury is of the type contemplated by the statute in that the defendant's
activity is infringing upon other uses found to be legitimate and
deserving of protection.
But the legislative history of the Act shows that the water quality
standards should not be given conclusive effect in a private action.s
Even in official proceedings under the Act, a court must give "due
consideration to the practicability and to the physical and economic
feasibility of securing abatement of any pollution proved. .. .
Senator Muskie, Senate sponsor and floor manager of the bill, agreed
during Senate debate that a court must rule on the "reasonableness"
of the standards ° In a common law nuisance suit, then, the water
quality standards should be admitted not as evidence of a per se tort,
but rather as one very important factor in the determination of rea-
sonable use.31
Perhaps the most effective use of the standards would be for a court
to rule that a prima facie case is established upon a showing that the
defendant has exceeded the waste disposal limits imposed by the Act.
The polluter would then have to offer compelling considerations to
justify his invasion of the rights of other riparians in disregard of stated
public policy.32 Reference to the water quality standards would shift
the focus of discussion from the reasonableness of defendant's use in
terms of industry practice to the reasonableness of defendant's use
in terms of a comprehensive allocation of water rights among legit-
28. S. Rep. No. 10, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) stated that "it is not the standards
themselves but abatement orders consistent with such standards which are enforcible."
Id. 10. Judicial determination in a private action that the standards werc not reasonable
would not affect the validity of those standards in a subsequent action brought at the
request of the Secretary of the Interior. Cf. 3 WATER AND WATER Ricars, § 428,2(C), supra
note 17, arguing that the standards, operating as both state and federal law, are subject
to conflicting judicial rulings. The book dismisses the possibility of private actions brought
under the Act without reaching the problem of the appropriateness of the standards to
common law tort actions.
29. 33 U.S.C. § 466g(h) (Supp. IV 1969).
30. Mr. Miller. At that stage [court action) of the proceeding, it would be proper
for the person aggrieved and the person against whom the abatement action Is being
brought to argue the reasonableness of the standards under which the abatement
action had been taken.
Mr. Muskie. Precisely.
111 CONG. REc. 1507 (1965).
31. A court may do so by taking judicial notice of the standards.
Many cases have recognized that a Court may take judicial notice of the rules,
regulations and orders of administrative agencies issued pursuant to their delegated
authority.
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Zantop Air Transp. Corp., 394 F. 2d 36, 40 (6th Cir. 1968).
32. The Act states:
The purpose [of this Act] is to enhance the quality and value of our water resources
and to establish a national policy for the prevention, control, and abatement of water
pollution.
33 U.S.C. § 466(a) (Supp. IV 1969).
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imate users. The riparian plaintiff would no longer face nearly
insuperable obstacles in his attempt to show that he has been unrea-
sonably harmed.
III. The Statute and the Remedy Problem
To abate pollution is more difficult than to recover damages, and
monetary damages are in any event inadequate if the private nuisance
action is to prove an effective control on pollution. But to secure an
injunction, the injured riparian must convince the court not only
that a nuisance exists but also that an injunction is the appropriate
form of relief. As an equitable remedy, an injunction is generally
available only when no adequate remedy exists at law. The legal
remedy tends to be insufficient in nuisance actions, since, by nature,
the offense is likely to be repeated. To require an injured riparian
to bring a series of actions is thought to impose too onerous a burden
upon him, 3 and to limit the injured riparian to compensation by
damages is to permit the polluter to condemn another's property for
private use.
Even when compensation by damages is manifestly inadequate,
however, the "comparative injury" doctrine may operate as a signif-
icant restriction upon the willingness of the courts to issue injunc-
tions. Under this doctrine, the court must weigh the harm which
would be caused to the plaintiff by failure to issue an injunction
against the costs which its issuance would impose upon the defendant
and the public interest.34 In Carp Pond Co. v. River Basin Paper
Co.,13 5 for example, the court found the defendant's use of a stream
to be unreasonable but refused to issue an injunction. The defen-
dant's investment was fifteen million dollars while the plaintiffs was
only ten thousand dollars. The Court based its decision on the ground
that "the granting of [an injunction] will work a great injury, entirely
33. Clark, Water Pollution Law in Idaho, I IDAgo L. REv. 111, 123 (1964).
34. This second-level balandng takes place only after the defendant's acthity has
been found to constitute a nuisance. It concerns the form of relief rather than the plain-
tiff's right to relief. See Clifton Iron Co. v. Dye, 87 Ala. 468 (1888); 1 Hmzt'E, &
JAMms, supra note 6, § 1.30, at 90-91; Maloney, The Balance of Convenience Doctrine in
the Southeastern States, Particularly as Applied to Water, 5 S.C.L.Q. 159, 166.67 (1952);
Note, A Survey of Common Law Remedies for Stream Pollution in New York, 10 Bu'Au.o
L. REv. 484, 488 (1961); Note, Statutory Treatment of Industrial Stream Pollution, supra
note 5, at 309-10. Cf. Borough of Westville v. Whitney Home Builders, 40 N.J. Super. 62.
122 A.2d 233 (1956).
35. 240 Mich. 279, 215 N.V. 325 (1927).
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disproportionate to that sustained by plaintiff, upon the defendants,
and that it will also seriously effect the prosperity of the city."80
Some courts, however, have rightfully repudiated the notion that
the greater size of a defendant's operation gives him a preponderance
of equity over the plaintiff because "if followed to its logical conclu-
sion, [it] would deprive the poor litigant of his property by giving it
to those already rich." 37 Moreover, the promotion of industrial growth
and the protection of jobs presumably found to constitute the "public
interest" by the Carp court are today only part of a "public interest"
which is more broadly defined. The growing realization that our
resources are limited gives the public a clear stake in water quality.
The public has an interest not only in the continued operation of the
polluter's factory but also, and just as properly, in the manner of its
operation. The Federal Act has given concrete expression, to this
broadened public interest;38 if the operation of a factory creates
pollution in excess of the negotiated permissible levels, the public
interest in water quality ought now to be considered in favor of en-
joining the excess pollution.
The technical complexity attending the issuance of injunctions
must also have contributed to the unwillingness of courts to grant
such relief in water pollution actions.89 Short of closing down a
factory, an injunction must specify the maximum permissible amount
of pollution and allow the polluter a reasonable time in which to
reduce his discharge below the maximum.4 The Federal Act could
now facilitate the issuance of these necessarily complex injunctions.
Basin-wide plans, specific as to poundage amounts of chemical pollu-
tants, are being developed to allocate waste-carrying capacity among
riparian owners. A court might well utilize the appropriate portion
of a plan in framing an injunction intended to prevent a polluter
from discharging more than his fair share of waste into a watercourse.
Even when legislative means of enforcement prove ineffective,
riparian owners may help to abate pollution through private nuisance
actions by drawing upon the public policy and the concrete standards
of the Federal Water Quality Act.
36. Id. at 289, 215 N.v. at 328.
37. Whalen v. Union Bag and Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 5, 101 N.E. 805 (1913); accord, e.g.,
Weston Paper Co. v. Pope, 155 Ind. 394, 57 N.E. 719 (1900).
38. See note 29 supra.
39. See Hanks, supra note 5, at 669.
40. The lack of appropriate abatement technology increases the equities on the tide
of the polluter, although arguably the lack of pressure on polluters is a primary reason
for the primitive state of technology. The proper authority will take the state of technology
into account in setting effluent standards. Thus the standards themselves represent a
resolution of the polluter's equities.
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